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ong a staple of Marine Corps
thinking, the concept of fourthgeneration warfare (4GW) is
gaining a broader audience. An interesting Microsoft Power Point presentation discussing 4GW and the
Iraqi insurgency recently surged to
viewers beyond the beltway. This
presentation complements the publication of Col Thomas X. Hammes'
4GW book, The Sling and the Stone:
On War in the 21st Century (Zenith
Press, St. Paul, MN, 2004).
Preparing for the Future
4GW defies concise summarization. It is nonlinear, idea driven, and
often involves nons tate actors who
refuse to abide by the rules of conventional conflict. Hammes describes this "anything goes" style of
warfare as using:
. . . all available networks-political,
economic, social and military-to
convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals
are either unachievable or too costly
for the perceived benefit.

It is a favorite of insurgents, rebels,
and other unconventional threats. It
could even be the approach of the
armies of developing countries.
4GW discussions are a timely
reminder of what are actually ancient verities of war. Indeed, there is
much to recommend about the theory of 4GW, especially in addressing
the current insurgency in Iraq. 4GW
proponents are especially "on target"
in highlighting the criticality of the
psychological dimension of war, that
is, the vital importance of truly
understanding the adversary's mindset and what it takes to overcome it.
Unfortunately, popular interpretations of 4GW have significant intellectual-and practical-gaps. For example, in today's incarnation 4GW is
unabashedly hostile to technology.
This is a deviation from its original
construct and out of line with the
view of its more thoughtful adherents today. Thus, some 4GW thinking has great potential to be misused
and misunderstood as a rationale to
redirect national defense resources
away from technologies critical to
maintaining military dominance in
the 21st century. In many pitches
about 4GW you will see lots of intriguing quotes critiquing what is
Marine Corps Gazette T:I July 2005

The Limits of FourthGeneration Warfare
Putting all of our military force capabilities into the
fourth-generation warfare basket is not the answer
for success on future battlefields.

C
\D

by BGen Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF

portrayed as the United States' overreliance upon technology. We need
to consider these carefully, especially
since Americans (airmen in particular, as the late military analyst and
author Carl Builder was wont to
note) can become overly enamored
with technology for technology'S
sake. That said, one of the quotes
you won't see in this or any 4GW
presentation, and one to consider
along with the critiques of technology, is that of historians Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson. They ominously warn that military technology
has the nasty habit of permitting "the
division of mankind into ruler and
ruled." Trivializing the role of technology in war can be catastrophic.
Polish cavalrymen learned that when
facing German Panzers and Stukas at
the outset of World War II.
Absent a disciplined approach,
4GW analysis becomes an exercise in
planning to "fight the last war,"
which is, from a strategic perspective, the current insurgency in Iraq.
As important as it is to succeed in
Iraq, we ought to be very careful
about allowing 4G W proponents to
dramatically reorient our entire
defense establishment to address today's threat at the expense of failing
to prepare to meet tomorrow's most
dangerous possible peril-a powerful
peer competitor like China.
In truth, nothing Iraqi insurgents
(or, frankly, even al-Qaeda terrorists)
can do could threaten the continued
survival of the United States as a free
country. It is true that extremely grievous harm might be inflicted by
them-and we must work to prevent
that-but inflicting truly fatal harm is
only a possibility for a peer competitor with a major, high-tech military
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capability (along with a significant
inventory of nuclear weapons, not
just one or a handful).
Examine Required Capabilities
As we look to the future, there will
likely be situations where all we want
or need to do to an adversary is to
destroy his physical capability to project military power. 4GW advocates
seem to think that we will always be
in the "defeat and nation-build"
mode. Actually, remaking/rebuilding societies may very often not be
on our agenda in future conflicts.
Frankly, the notion of occupying an
opponent's territory and remaking
his political! cultural system may not
be feasible or even particularly desired under many circumstances. We
will never wish, for example, to occupy any portion of any of the nations
that may become military peer competitors in the 21st century. Protecting ourselves from their force projection potential may completely satisfy our objectives.
To the untutored and shortsighted, exposure to 4G W aficionados
could lead to an assumption that all
security problems are solvable by
some amalgam of the Marine Corps
and special forces (a view I doubt is
actually shared by those forces or,
for that matter, the more thoughtful
analysts of 4GW). Regardless, as important as those capabilities are, they
(or some combination of them)
could not alone stop an authentic
peer competitor bent on our destruction as a viable political entity.
The reality is that it takes decisive
quantities of dominating weaponry
along with well-trained warfighters
from across all of the military Services to stop the kinds of forces that
www.mca·marines.orglgazette

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

could really jeopardize the existence
of the United States as anything we
would recognize today. As terrific as
the Marine Corps is and as talented
c./)
as the special forces community is, I
+-'
Q.. suspect that military planners of
potentially hostile nations, like SoQ)
U viet planners before them and Iraqi
C insurgents today, find them difficult
but confrontable opponents.
U
Though it is an anathema to 4GW
'-"'
zealots, what actually inflicts despair
and hopelessness upon the minds of
adversaries these days is overwhelming dominating weapons. It is being
attacked by systems against which the
most hardened and dedicated warfighters are helpless. Yes, I am talking
about things like the F/ A-22 and the
Joint Strike Fighter, that is, weapons
that can dictate who lives and who dies
on tomorrow's battlefields. Such capabilities can hold at risk every object
they value in their society. And though
it is faddish in the think tank circles to
conclude otherwise, it is actually silly
to suggest that the "ideas" and "culture" of a society-especially one with
rapidly rising quality-of-life expectations-are unrelated to the objects it
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possesses and desires. Even seemingly
ideologically driven opponents very
often have valued touchstones in
material objects.
It is the array of high-tech, uniquely American weaponry that causes
our potential peer competitors to
know that achieving their objectives
by force is simply not obtainable
within their lifetimes. In truth, it is
the inability to control the air, not
any number of ground forces, however skilled, that wakes them up at
night in a cold sweat. And it is not
just airpower; it is the insurmountable gap in the quantity and quality
of U.S. ballistic missile and attack
submarines. And before we start
tossing out so-called "legacy" systems
as "unchic," consider the reports
about the dread that Iraqi insurgents
have about the fearsome MIAI tank.
Think about what these platforms
and other high-tech weapons can do
to the minds of potential enemies.
4GW devotees too often completely
miss the profound psychological
impact on even the most combathardened fighters of technology
against which they are completely

Launch the Intruders
A Naval Attack Squadron in the
Vietnam War, 1972
Carol Reardon
"One of the finest cockpit views of the air war over
Vietnam ever written. Reardon tells us the whole
story of the war-from the missions flown and
bombs dropped to the plight of the enlisted bomb
handler and the story of the wives left behind. Her
sensitivity for detail and context makes this book
soar far above your typical squadron history or
pilot memoir."-John Sherwood, author of
Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War
"A winner! This is one of the finest small unit
histories to come out of Vietnam or any other
war [and] a real contribution to the history of
Naval aviation."-John F. Guilmartin, Jr., author
of A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang
Modern War Studies

440 pages, 37 photographs, 4 maps, Cloth $34.95

o
40

helpless. Warfighters like to say that
the enemy "always gets a vote" as to
whether a combat operation succeeds. What American technology
can do in many instances is to literally disenfranchise the adversary. The
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
were just as tough and determined as
the mujahideen who successfully
fought the Russians. What proved to
be decisive was the ability to hold at
risk Soviet military aviation with the
help of U.S. Stinger missiles. That
circumstance did not exist in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
The emergence of extremely accurate joint direct attack munitions and
other precision technology changed
things radically. They enabled the
application of precise combat power
from beyond the range of any defensive
weapon. This development did not
just physically destroy enemy forces;
it crushed their will to fight. There is
nothing like a feeling of total vulnerability to undermine fighting spirit.
Force majeure-Napoleon's "big
battalions" so to speak-sounds antiquated, but thousands of years of
military history prove otherwise. In
21st century conflicts, "mass" ought
to be defined by deliverable combat
power, not numbers per se. And it is
ludicrous to suggest that high technology does not create deliverable
combat power in distinctively effective ways.
In 21st century warfare, control of
the air and sea mediums will, more
than anything else, eliminate the
force projection capabilities/ possibilities/hopes of potential adversaries. The ability to exercise that
control is essential-and irreplaceable-to safeguarding the U.S. homeland in the coming years.

>BGen Dunlap serves as the Staff Judge
Advocate, Air Combat Command, Langley
Air Force Base, VA. His views and opinions
are his alone and do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Government or any of its
components.
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